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PROVING QUALIFICATION IN A UNIVERSITY
SETTING: McDONNELL DOUGLAS AND THE
TENURE CASES
I. Introduction
The scenario is frequently the same: a minority candidate who
holds a probationary faculty position at a college or university is
denied tenure.' Though the institution claims that the denial was
based on the candidate's deficiency in one of three important areas,
2
he suspects that, in reality, the denial was based on his minority
status.3 The unsuccessful candidate's recourse, after exhausting inter-
nal grievance procedures, is to sue under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 4 which expressly prohibits employment discrimination
1. See Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 165 (2d Cir.
Feb. 22, 1984); Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 53 (1982); Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d
Cir. 1980); Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980); Scott v.
University of Del., 601 F.2d 76 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979); Davis v.
Weidner, 596 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1979); Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978); Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d
Cir. 1974); Green v. Board of Regents of Tex. Tech Univ., 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.
1973); Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 495 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Mass.
1980), aJ'd, 648 F.2d 61 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Gilinsky v.
Columbia Univ., 488 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Cussler v. University of Md.,
430 F. Supp. 602 (D. Md. 1977); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857 (D.
Vt. 1976).
2. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
3. See generally Vladeck and Young, Sex Discrimination in Higher Education:
It's Not Academic, 4 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 59 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SEX
DISCRIMINATION].
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2OOe-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 703(a) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
Id. § 2000e - 2(a).
Title VII is enforced and administered by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 5 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (Title VII, §
706). A Title VII complaint must begin with the filing of a charge with the EEOC.
Following a preliminary settlement attempt, the case is investigated, and the EEOC
makes a determination as to whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the
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based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 5 Title VII, which
initially excluded educational institutions, was amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 to include these employers. 6
In 1973, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green7 de-
scribed for the first time8 a method of analysis to be utilized in Title
VII disparate treatment cases. 9 This methodology, 10 which set forth
charge is true. If the EEOC finds reasonable cause, there is an attempt to conciliate.
If unsucessful, the EEOC determines whether or not to litigate the case. Issuance by
the EEOC of a right-to-sue notice to the charging party affords him the right to bring
suit in federal district court within ninety days of the issuance of the letter. Id. §
2000e - 5(f)(1). The remedies available to the charging party include enjoining the
proscribed behavior, reinstatement and back pay for no more than two years from
the time of the filing of the charge. Id. § 2000e - 5(g).
Coverage of Title VII extends to all entities employing fifteen or more employees
for at least 20 calendar weeks of the current year and which are engaged in an
industry affecting commerce. Id. § 2000e(b) (Title VII, § 701).
The act does not cover (1) religious institutions where employment of persons of a
particular religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification;
(2) members of the Communist Party or (3) aliens; however, it does permit preferen-
tial treatment of American Indians. Id. § 2000e - 1, - 2(e)(f)(i) (Title VII, § 703).
5. Id. § 2000e - 2.
6. See Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 8, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). The Act also extended Title
VII's protections to employees of the Federal Government. Id. § 2000e - 16.
7. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
8. Note, Relative Qualifications and the Prima Facie Case in Title VII Litiga-
tion, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 553, 554 (1982) [hereinafter cited as RELATIVE QUALIFICA-
TIONS].
9. The first major Title VII case dealt with by the Supreme Court was Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs, however, discussed the analysis of
disparate impact cases under Title VII. Disparate impact cases involve employment
practices that are facially neutral in the treatment of different groups but that, in
fact, fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36
n.15 (1977).
Disparate treatment occurs when "the employer treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. Proof of
discriminatory intent is critical in these cases whereas it is not required under a
disparate impact theory. Id.
McDonnell Douglas involved a suit which arose under Title VII. However, the
Court's analysis of a disparate treatment claim has also been applied to discrimina-
tion cases arising under other federal statutes cited below.
Cases brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976),
include: Crawford v. Western Elec. Co. Inc., 614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980); Scott v.
University of Del., 601 F.2d 76 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979); Powell
v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978);
Flowers v. Crouch - Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Banerjee v. Board
of Trustees of Smith College, 495 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Mass. 1980), aff'd, 648 F.2d 61
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Gilinsky v. Columbia Univ., 488 F.
Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Cases brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) include:
Lee v. Conecuh County Bd. of Educ., 634 F.2d 959 (5th Cir 1981); Davis v.
Weidner, 596 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1979).
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the allocations of burdens of pleading and proof" in disparate treat-
ment cases, was variously interpreted by the lower courts,' 2 thus
producing anything but the uniformity that the Supreme Court had
anticipated. In several subsequent decisions,' 3 the Court attempted to
clarify the holding in McDonnell Douglas.
The question of which party bears the burden of proving qualifica-
tion for a particular job, however, remains unclear. The problem
arises mainly in white collar and professional level jobs where the use
of subjective criteria 4 is critical in determining whether a candidate is
the best qualified person for a position. These criteria are particularly
relevant in the area of academic employment, where decisions regard-
ing promotion and tenure necessarily involve subjective evaluations of
professionalism. 15
Cases brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),
29 U.S.C. § 621 - 34 (1975), include: Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978);
Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir 1983); Sutton v. Atlantic
Richfield, 646 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1981); Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316
(4th Cir. 1980); Harpring v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1980); Loeb
v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979); Schwager v. Sun Oil Co. of Pa., 591
F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1979).
10. See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
13. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Burdine.
14. Subjective criteria involve elements of judgment and discretion while objec-
tive criteria are standards or requirements that are applied to all employees. See
generally, Waintroob, The Developing Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at
the White Collar and Professional Level 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 45, 48 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Waintroob].
15. See Danzl v. North St. Paul - Maplewood - Oakdale Indep. School, 706 F.2d
813, 816 (8th Cir. 1983) (candidate hired was better qualified due to prior experience
as high school principal); Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1343
(9th Cir. 1981) (tenure denied due to fact that scholars and administration officials
were unenthusiastic about plaintiff's scholarly work), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 53
(1982); Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 79 (3d Cir.) (inadequate evidence of
research activity), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979); Davis v. Weidner, 596 F.2d
726, 730-31 (7th Cir. 1979) (termination due to over-abundance of foreign language
instructors); Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1156 (2d Cir.) (inadequate
performance as teacher), cert. denied 439 U.S. 984 (1978); Faro v. New York Univ.,
502 F.2d 1229, 1231 (2d Cir. 1974) (male professors hired had more substantial
teaching and research backgrounds); Green v. Board of Regents of Tex. Tech Univ.,
474 F.2d 594, 596 (5th Cir. 1973) (deficiencies in teaching and scholarship); Banerjee
v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 495 F. Supp. 1148, 1160 (D. Mass. 1980)
(plaintiff's scholarship was inadequate), aff'd, 648 F.2d 61 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Laborde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 495 F. Supp. 1067,
1069 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (inadequate scholarship), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 820 (1983);
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The subjective nature of the tenure decision, however, is one reason
for judicial reluctance to intercede in areas involving academic judg-
ment. This judicial reluctance has made it virtually impossible for a
faculty plaintiff to succeed in a Title VII disparate treatment case.' 6
Though judicial abstention from challenging an academic decision on
the merits is likely to persist, courts may be more willing to challenge
a defendant's choice of candidate where there is a clear showing of
some kind of procedural error by the institution. 7 Therefore, it is
imperative that colleges and universities explicitly detail the proce-
dures employed in tenure decisions. This would afford the plaintiff
the opportunity to be granted relief based on the university's failure to
apply its own performance standards even-handedly.
This Note explores problems of proving relative qualifications under
Title VII. It begins with a discussion of the allocations of burdens of
proof and pleading under Title VII and proceeds to address the ques-
tion of which party must prove relative qualification under the Mc-
Donnell Douglas formula. Finally, the Note analyzes the role of sub-
jective criteria in the tenure setting.
II. Development of the Standard for Allocating Burdens of Proof
Title VII was enacted to proscribe discrimination based on mem-
bership in a protected class.' 8 Lower courts handling discrimination
claims after the passage of Title VII, however, exhibited some confu-
sion as to the appropriate allocation of burdens of proof.' 9 Though the
Supreme Court has addressed the problem several times beginning
with McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the precise burdens to be borne by
the parties remain unclear. 20
Gilinsky v. Columbia Univ., 488 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (another
department member hired); Patino v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 226,
228 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (plaintiff's outside interests caused his teaching skills to suffer);
Cussler v. University of Md., 430 F. Supp. 602, 606 (D. Md. 1977) (poor quality of
publications and lack of professionally recognized expertise); Peters v. Middlebury
College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 860 (D. Vt. 1976) (termination due to plaintiff's inability
to adequately teach Renaissance courses).
16. See infra note 124 for a list of cases in which institutional defendants have
been successful and in which faculty plaintiffs have achieved procedural victories.
17. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
19. The McDonnell Douglas Court heard the case because "[t]he two opinions of
the Court of Appeals and the several opinions of the three judges of that court
attempted, with a notable lack of harmony, to state the applicable rules as to burden
of proof and how this shifts upon the making of a prima facie case." 411 U.S. at 801.
20. See infra notes 21-57 and 98-107.
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A. McDonnell Douglas v. Green
McDonnell Douglas v. Green is the seminal case in the area of
burdens of proof in disparate treatment cases under Title VII. 2 ' The
case involved a black civil rights activist who was laid off by McDon-
nell Douglas and later participated in demonstrations against the
company. When the company subsequently advertised for qualified
personnel, Green applied, but he was rejected based on his allegedly
illegal conduct. 22 Green filed a complaint with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charging violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC found reasonable
cause to believe the allegations and made several unsuccessful at-
tempts at conciliation. Upon receipt of a "right-to-sue" notice,2 3
Green brought suit in the district court but lost. 24
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, setting
forth standards governing the case: (1) Green had made out a prima
facie case which raised an inference of discrimination; (2) the com-
pany failed to rebut the inference by offering "subjective" reasons-
allegedly illegal conduct-for its refusal to rehire Green; and (3)
Green should be given an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons
offered were mere pretext to mask discrimination.2 5 The Supreme
Court granted a writ of certiorari to clarify the standards of proof
governing cases of employment discrimination. 21
The McDonnell Douglas Court outlined a three step procedure by
which evidence in a private, non-class action suit claiming employ-
ment discrimination may be analyzed.27 The complainant must first
establish a prima facie case by showing that (1) he belongs to a racial
minority; 2 (2) he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
21. See generally Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in
Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1979);
Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment
Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Mendez]; Yurko, Judicial
Recognition of Academic Collective Interests: A New Approach to Faculty Title VII
Litigation, 60 B.U.L. REV. 473 (1980).
22. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796.
23. See supra note 4 for a summary of the filing procedures to be followed under
Title VII.
24. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794-97.
25. Id. at 798.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 802. Absent a "smoking gun" or direct evidence, this circumstantial
evidence test applies.
28. The Court noted that "[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and
the specification . . . of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." Id. at 802
1984] 463
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employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (4) after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applications from persons who shared
the complainant's qualifications. 29 The Court agreed with the Eighth
Circuit that Green had satisfied the requirements of a prima facie
case: he was black, he was undisputedly qualified, though qualified
he was rejected and the company continued to seek mechanics with
Green's qualifications.30
If the complainant meets his burden, the second step is that "the
burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."' 3' The Court
decided that the company's stated reason for refusing to rehire Green,
that he engaged in illegal conduct, was sufficient to "discharge [the
employer's] burden of proof at this stage and to meet [Green's] prima
facie case of discrimination. "32
If the defendant is successful in rebutting the inference raised by the
plaintiff's prima facie case, the plaintiff must be given a fair opportu-
nity to show that the defendant's reason for rejecting the plaintiff was
actually a pretext masking unlawful discrimination. 33 Considerations
relevant to a finding of pretext might include a showing that other
employees who engaged in comparable acts were rehired, facts re-
garding the company's treatment of Green during his prior employ-
ment, the company's general policies on civil rights activities, and its
practices with respect to minority employment. 34 On remand, Green's
showing of pretext was deemed to be insufficient. 35
Thus, the Court described the basic framework for allocation of
burdens in a Title VII case in which disparate treatment is alleged. 36
n.13. Although the test was devised for cases involving racial discrimination, it has
been extended to cover other classes protected by Title VII. See, e.g., Smith v.
University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980) (age); Kunda v. Muhlenberg
College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980) (sex); Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d
1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Huang v. College of the Holy Cross, 436 F. Supp. 639
(D. Mass. 1977) (race, color and national origin discrimination).
29. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 803.
33. Id. at 804.
34. id. at 804-05.
35. See Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976)
(affirming district court finding against Green).
36. The Court did not, however, intend the McDonnell Doiuglas ground rules to
be the only way to establish a case of discrimination. Rather, this allocation of
burdens of proof and pleading was intended to provide a "sensible, orderly way to
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While the order in which evidence must be presented was plainly
established, questions remained as to the burden of proof to be borne
by each party within a given step. Though the type of qualification
that a plaintiff must demonstrate to make out a prima facie case
remained unclear, 37 the first element to cause confusion among the
evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination." Furnco v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). A case of
disparate treatment may be made out in other ways. For instance, section 707(a) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any
person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance
to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this Title, and that the
pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full
exercise of the rights herein described, the Attorney General may bring a
civil action ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) for a
discussion of a systemwide pattern or practice of disparate treatment. "The impor-
tance of McDonnell Douglas lies, not in its specification of the discrete elements of
proof there required, but in its recognition of the general principal that any Title VII
plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an
inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal
under the Act." Id. at 358. Therefore, plaintiff may make out a prima facie case of
discrimination by "demonstrating the existence of a discriminatory hiring.pattern
and practice." Id. at 359 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772
(1976)).
37. A Title VII plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing actions by the
employer from which one may infer, in the absence of explanation, that such actions
were based on a discriminatory motive. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358. Thus, establish-
ment of a prima facie case creates a presumption of prohibited discrimination be-
cause it eliminates the most legitimate reasons for an employer's actions-absolute or
relative lack of qualifications and absence of a vacancy in the job sought. Id. at 358
n.44. Some courts, however, have required plaintiffs to prove relative qualification
as part of their prima facie case. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
Elimination of the above common nondiscriminatory reasons for an employer's
action creates a rebuttable inference of discrimination. Courts have referred to both
an inference and a presumption of discrimination. See, e.g., United States Postal
Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1481 (1983) (prima facie case
creates rebuttable presumption of discrimination); Texas Dep't of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (prima facie case raises inference of
discrimination); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1181 (6th Cir. 1983)
(prima facie case raises inference of discrimination); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic
Co., Numerical Control, Inc., 690 F.2d 88, 94 (6th Cir. 1982) (elements raise
inference of discrimination); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 (1st Cir.
1979) (prima facie case raises inference of discrimination). See generally Belton,
Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Proce-
dural justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1221-22 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Belton].
According to Belton, a presumption is a rule of law that allows an assumption of a
certain factual situation based on proof of other logically related facts. Genuine
presumptions serve to shift the burden of production to the party against whom it
operates. Id. at 1222. An inference "is a deduction warranted by human reason and
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lower courts was the extent of the defendant's burden. The lower
courts disagreed over whether the Court's statement that the defend-
ant must "articulate" a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 38 meant a
shifting of the burden of persuasion or meant merely a burden of
production. 3
B. Other Efforts to Establish Clear Standards: Furnco, Sweeney and
Burdine
The confusion resulting from McDonnell Douglas prompted the
Court to reexamine the question of burdens of proof in Furnco v.
Waters.40 In Furnco, the Court explained that the plaintiff's prima
facie case did not serve as proof of discrimination but, rather, it
simply raised an inference of discrimination because we "presume
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on
the consideration of impermissible factors. '"'
The Furnco Court stated that the burden which shifts to the de-
fendant employer in rebutting the inference of discrimination raised
by the plaintiff is one of "proving" that its decision was based on
nondiscriminatory criteria. 42 The Court's pronouncement succeeded
only in reinforcing the initial confusion created by McDonnell
Douglas, since a burden of proof may encompass the two separate
burdens of persuasion and production. 43 Moreover, the McDonnell
experience that the factfinder may make from established facts. The term refers to a
process of reasoning from a premise to a conclusion, the end result of which has the
directive force of a rule of law-which characterizes a presumption." Id.
38. 411 U.S. at 802.
39. Courts ruling that a production of evidence by the defendant was sufficient
include: Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 984 (1978); Barnes v. St. Catherine's Hosp., 563 F.2d 324, 329 (7th Cir.
1977); Flowers v. Crouch - Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (7th Cir. 1977);
Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir. 1975); Sabol v.
Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009, 1012 (10th Cir. 1975); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522
F.2d 333, 347-48 (10th Cir. 1975); Gates v. Georgia - Pacific Corp., 492 F.2d 292,
295-96 (9th Cir. 1974); Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 868 (D. Vt. 1976).
Courts reasoning that the plaintiff's showing of a prima facie case shifts the burden
of persuasion to the defendant, thus requiring it to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that it acted pursuant to a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason include:
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1245-46 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Turner v. Texas
Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977); Ostrapowicz v. Johnson
Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 399 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
40. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
41. Id. at 577 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44). See supra note 37 on the
difference between presumptions and inferences.
42. 438 U.S. at 577.
43. See generally Belton, supra note 37 at 1216. The burden of production is the
obligation to present evidence of sufficient substance to permit the factfinders to act
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Douglas requirement of "articulating" appears to be easier to meet
than that of "proving" a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. 44
Several months later, the Supreme Court attempted to explain the
seeming disparity between McDonnell Douglas and Furnco. In Board
of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney,45 a tenure case, the
Court stated that while such words as "articulate," "show" and
"prove" might seem to mean the same thing, the correct interpretation
was that the defendant need only come forward with enough credible
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to rebut the plain-
tiffs prima facie showing of disparate treatment. 46 Therefore, the
defendant need only clearly state the reasons for the action taken; he is
under no obligation to prove a nondiscriminatory intent. In Sweeney,
the First Circuit had decided in favor of the faculty plaintiff based on
the college's failure to disprove the inference raised by the plaintiff's
prima facie case. 47 The court of appeals' requirement that the defend-
ant "prove absence of discriminatory motive 48 was rejected by the
Supreme Court, which found that the lower court's treatment im-
posed a heavier burden on the employer than was warranted. 49
After Sweeney, 50 most of the circuits recognized that the defend-
ant's burden in disparate treatment cases was simply that of articulat-
ing a legitimate reason for its actions. 5' However, the Fifth Circuit
upon it. The burden of persuasion relates to the risk of uncertainty of an element's
resolution. If the trier of fact finds the parties in equipoise over a material issue, the
party bearing the burden of persuasion will lose. Id.
44. "Articulate" is generally defined to mean "to give clear and effective utter-
ance to" or "expressing oneself clearly and effectively enough to gain attention."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 124 (1976). "Prove" has been
defined to mean "to establish a fact or hypothesis as true by satisfactory and sufficient
evidence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (5th ed. 1979). Therefore, in order to
"articulate" a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the defendant need only clearly
state his reasons, not establish the truth of his stated reason.
45. 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam).
46. Id. at 25. The court added that forcing the defendant to prove absence of
discriminatory motive would make the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis
entirely superfluous since it would place on the employer at the second stage the
burden of showing that the reason for the rejection was not pretext. Id. at 24-25 n.1.
47. See Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 178-
79 (1st Cir. 1978).
48. Id. at 177.
49. 439 U.S. at 24-25.
50. That is, that the defendant need only articulate not prove. Id.
51. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Cant, 630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980) (defendant
need only "bring forth evidence that [it] acted on a neutral basis"); Kunda v.
Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 543-44 (3d Cir. 1980) (district court had not
imposed burden of persuasion on defendant but properly required only articulation
of legitimate reason); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1011 (1st Cir. 1979)
1984]
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still required the defendant to prove nondiscriminatory motives by a
preponderance of the evidence. 52
Once again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to attempt to
resolve the issue of the extent of the defendant's burden. In Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,53 the Court finally
settled the question, stating that "the employer need only produce
admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to
conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by
discriminatory animus. " 54 To further clarify its position, the Court
added that the defendant need only satisfy a burden of production
sufficient to rebut the inference of discrimination raised by the prima
facie case.55 While the defendant does not bear a formal burden of
persuasion, he must produce enough evidence to convince the trier of
fact that the decision was lawful.5 6 Evidently, this standard requires
more than mere articulation of proper intentions but less than actually
proving nondiscriminatory motives.
According to the Court, limiting the defendant's evidentiary bur-
den, as discussed in Burdine, would not unduly hinder the plaintiff's
case since (1) the defendant's explanation of its legitimate reasons must
be clear and reasonably specific; (2) the defendant will normally
attempt to prove the factual basis for its explanation; and (3) in a Title
VII suit, the plaintiff is aided by access to the EEOC's investigatory
files concerning his complaint and by the liberal discovery rules which
are generally applicable.57 After four decisions58 in eight years, the
Court finally concluded that the defendant's burden in disparate
treatment cases arising under Title VII is simply to establish a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. These four decisions
are not inconsistent; rather, they represent a progression of analyses
(burden of persuasion remains with plaintiff; defendant need only bear a burden of
production or articulation of nondiscriminatory motive); Davis v. Weidner, 596 F.2d
726, 732 (7th Cir. 1979) (defendant's articulated reasons were legitimate).
52. Burdine v. Texas Dep't of CommUnity Affairs, 608 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1979),
vacated, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.
1980). The Eighth Circuit also followed a preponderance of the evidence test in
Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 620 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450
U.S. 972 (1981).
53. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
54. Id. at 257.
55. Id. at 258.
56. Id. See infra note 96 regarding the THAYER or "bursting bubble" theory.
57. Burdinc, 450 U.S. at 258. See Comment, Civil Rights Defendant's Burden of
Proof in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 149 (1981).
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which resulted in an orderly method for presentation of evidence in a
disparate treatment case.
58
III. Proving Relative Qualification
The McDonnell Douglas analysis seems to require a plaintiff to
show qualification for a particular job as part of his prima facie case. 59
However, the opinion declined to explain the exact burden to be borne
by the plaintiff; that is, whether it is sufficient for a plaintiff to show
objective qualification 60 or whether he must show relative qualifica-
tion6 at this initial stage. Objective or absolute qualifications are
useful at the initial screening stage of the hiring procedure. At the
point of the final hiring, however, where the employer must choose
from many persons who meet the minimum qualifications, subjective
criteria often enter into the analysis.6 2
A. Types of Criteria Considered in Determining Qualification
Generally, qualification for hiring or promotion is judged by objec-
tive and subjective criteria.63 Objective criteria are standards that are
automatically applied to all candidates for a particular position.6 4
Such criteria, which predominate in lower-level or blue-collar hir-
ing, 5 include easily quantifiable factors such as education, height,
weight, seniority, typing skill and absenteeism .66
Subjective criteria "involve an element of judgment or discretion on
the part of the evaluator."'  These criteria are intangible and include
58. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792; Furnco, 438 U.S. 567; Sweeney, 439 U.S.
24 and Burdine, 450 U.S. 248. See supra notes 21-56 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the McDon-
nell Douglas analysis.
60. Objective qualification refers to the "minimum ... credentials or skills that
are announced by an employer as requirements for a particular job." RELATIVE
QUALIFICATIONS, supra note 8 at 557.
61. Relative qualification refers to the "subjectively-measured qualification of
favorable comparison with other applicants." RELATIVE QUALIFICATIONS, supra note
8 at 557.
62. RELATIVE QUALIFICATIONS, supra note 8 at 557 n.28.
63. See generally Waintroob, supra note 14; Note, Title VII and Employment
Discrimination in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1614 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as UPPER LEVEL JOBS]; Note, Subjective Employment Criteria and the Future of
Title VII in Professional Jobs, 54 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 165 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
PROFESSIONAL JOBS].
64. Waintroob, supra note 14 at 48.
65. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
66. UPPER LEVEL JOBS, supra note 63 at 1630.
67. Waintroob, supra note 14 at 48.
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such amorphous concepts as leadership, ability to communicate effec-
tively and to take decisive action.6 8 Use of subjective criteria in hiring
and promotion is generally permissible in white collar and profes-
sional contexts but is frowned upon in the area of blue collar employ-
ment.69 Generally, as the level of employment rises,70 judicial accept-
ance of subjectivity in employment decisions increases.7' This may be
due to the fact that
[j]udges are more likely to have personal knowledge of the jobs of
plaintiffs in the white collar context, such as airline stewardesses
and salesmen, than of the jobs of blue collar plaintiffs. They better
appreciate the type of work upper-level plaintiffs perform and
recognize the different variables an employer might reasonably
consider when searching for personnel to fill these positions. 72
68. UPPER LEVEL JOBS, supra note 63 at 1630.
69. Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972), is the leading
case on the use of subjective criteria in blue-collar employment situations. Rowe took
place in a blue-collar context in which a worker could be promoted only upon receipt
of the recommendation of his immediate foreman. Thus, the worker's chances for
promotion were based on the foreman's subjective evaluation of the worker's ability,
merit and capacity. Id. at 353.
The Rowe court found that defendant General Motors' promotional practices were
violative of Title VII in five respects:
(i) The foreman's recommendation is the indispensable single most im-
portant factor in the promotion process.
(ii) Foremen are given no written instructions pertaining to the qualifi-
cations necessary for promotion ....
(iii) Those standards which were determined to be controlling are vague
and subjective.
(iv) Hourly employees are not notified of promotion opportunities nor
are they notified of the qualifications necessary to get jobs.
(v) There are no safeguards in the procedure designed to avert discrimi-
natory practices.
Id. at 358-59.
70. See generally PROFESSIONAL JoBs, supra note 63 at: 168-69 for a discussion of
the three major job classifications: blue collar, white collar and professional employ-
ment, as classified by the U.S. Department of Labor in its DICTIONARY OF OCCUPA-
TIONAL TITLES (PROFESSIONAL JOBS cites to the 3d ed. 1965, which has been super-
seded by the 4th ed. 1977).
For example, the blue collar class includes jobs which have been categorized by the
Department of Labor as "service," "machine trades," "benchwork," "structural" and
"miscellaneous" categories such as truck drivers. PROFESSIONAL JOBS at 169; DICTIO-
NARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES at xxxvii-xli. White-collar employees are engaged in
managerial and technical occupations such as bank officers, wage analysts and sales
personnel. PROFESSIONAL JOBS at 169, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES at xxxvi-
xxxvii. The "professional class" includes teachers, university professors, engineers,
attorneys and physicians. PROFESSIONAL JoBs at 169; DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL
TITLES at xxxvi.
71. Waintroob, supra note 14, at 50.
72. PROFESSIONAL JOBS, supra note 63, at 186.
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Relative qualification is the principle by which one candidate must
show that he was as qualified or better qualified than the party
selected. 73 The question of whether one candidate is better qualified
than another may be difficult to resolve in upper-level and profes-
sional employment contexts where subjective criteria necessarily enter
into the employment decision. Establishing qualifications is an em-
ployer's prerogative, but an employer may not judge employee quali-
fication by wholly subjective standards and then claim lack of qualifi-
cation when its promotion process is challenged as discriminatory.
7 4
B. Which Party Bears the Burden of Proving Relative Qualification
In McDonnell Douglas, the employer did not dispute its employee's
basic qualification for the job.7 5 Therefore, the Court expressly de-
clined to address the question. 6 This omission opened the door for the
variety of lower court interpretations that resulted. For example,
without a Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Circuit, in East v.
Romine, Inc. 77 declared that the defendant, in rebutting plaintiff's
prima facie case, must prove by objective evidence that the person
hired or promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff. 78 This would
be accomplished by the introduction of comparative evidence of each
applicant's credentials. 79 In Romine, the court decided that the plain-
tiff was "presumptively qualified on the basis of an application which
showed a long history of welding work."'80 Since welding skill is an
objective criterion, the court required the defendant to show that the
candidate selected was objectively rather than subjectively better
qualified to work as a welder.8 '
Four years later, the Fifth Circuit applied the Romine standard in
Burdine.82 On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court criticized the
Fifth Circuit's requirement that the defendant bear the burden of
73. See RELATIVE QUALIFICATIONS, supra note 8, at 557; see also supra notes 60-
61 for definitions of objective and subjective qualifications.
74. Rowe, 457 F.2d at 358.
75. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; supra note 30 and accompanying
text.
76. 411 U.S. at 802 n.14.
77. 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1975), overruled, 647 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1981).
78. Id. at 339-40.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 338.
81. Id. at 340. The defendant was unable to show that the candidate chosen was
objectively better qualified.
82. 608 F.2d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See supra
notes 53-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of Burdine.
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proof of relative qualification.83 The Court noted that Title VII does
not demand that an employer give preferential treatment to minori-
ties or women. 84 The Act was not intended to encroach on the tradi-
tional prerogatives of management,8 5 nor does it require an employer
to restructure his hiring practices to maximize the number of minori-
ties and women hired.86 Rather, an employer "has discretion to choose
among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not
based upon unlawful criteria."' The fact that a court believes that the
employer misjudged the qualifications of the candidates does not
expose the employer to liability under Title VII. 88
The Burdine Court's statements that the "burden of establishing a
prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous"89 and that the
defendant need not prove by objective evidence that the party hired
was more qualified than the plaintiff90 clearly express the Court's
preference that the plaintiff should bear the burden of proof. Despite
the relative clarity of the opinion, it engendered considerable confu-
sion in the lower courts concerning what "qualified" meant and who
bore the burden of showing superior qualification. 9'
Evidence of qualification has been considered by different courts at
various stages of the three step analysis. Some courts insist that a
plaintiff prove as part of his prima facie case that he was the most
qualified candidate for the job or that he was at least as qualified as
the party actually selected.92 This task may be readily accomplished in
83. 450 U.S. 248, 258-59 (1981).
84. Id' at 259; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2(j) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Accord
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 205-06 (1979) (Title VII
does not require employer to engage in voluntary affirmative action plan to correct
racial imbalance in its workforce).
85. Weber, 443 U.S. at 207; see Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259.
86. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259 (citing Furnco, 438 U.S at 577-78 (1978)).
87. Id.
88. Id. See Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 1980) (Title VII does
not require that candidate whom court considers most qualified be awarded a
particular position; it requires only that choice of candidate not be discriminatory);
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.6 (1st Cir. 1979) (while employer's
judgment may seem erroneous to outsiders, relevant inquiry is simply whether articu-
lated reason was pretext for illegal discrimination; reason need not be such that judge
or jurors would approve).
89. 450 U.S. at 253.
90. Id. at 258. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
91. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMINATION LAW
1298 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as SCHLEI & GROSSMAN].
92. See, e.g., Adams v. Reed, 567 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (5th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff
ranked only fourth or fifth in five candidate field; being "highly qualified" was
insufficient); Olson v. Philco - Ford, 531 F.2d 474, 478 (10th Cir. 1976) (prima facie
case requires more than proof that qualified man was chosen over qualified woman).
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a lower-level employment context where the criteria involved in the
selection process are purely objective. However, in upper-level and
professional employment, where qualification is determined by objec-
tive and subjective criteria, this approach is inappropriate. The plain-
tiff would be forced to proffer all of his evidence at step one, thus
defeating the purposes of the McDonnell Douglas three step scheme. 9
Other courts only require that the plaintiff show minimum qualifi-
cations to make out a prima facie case, and that the defendant, in
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action,
show that the candidate selected was better qualified than the plain-
tiff.94 Thus, some courts require that relative qualification be demon-
strated as part of the defendant's burden of production. This approach
is far more acceptable in cases involving upper-level and professional
jobs, where subjective factors are of prime consideration.9" Carrying
the McDonnell Douglas analysis to its logical conclusion, one could
argue that the intent of the Court was simply to have the plaintiff
show that, according to quantifiable factors which could be compared
among the candidates, he was qualified to be considered for the job.
Finally, other courts have decided that after the plaintiff and de-
fendant have met their initial burdens, the presumption of discrimina-
tion drops from the case, 96 and the plaintiff, who at all times bears the
burden of persuasion, must convince the trier of fact that he was at
least as qualified as the party selected. 97 This theory supports the view
93. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the types of
criteria involved in employment decisions.
94. See, e.g., Lvnn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1344-45 (9th
Cir. 1981) (for prima facie case plaintiff need only show minimum qualifications,
and relative qualification should be established bv employer at step two), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 53 (1982); Davis v. Weidner, 596 F.2d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 1979)
(plaintiff need not show relative qualification as part of prima facie case); Rich v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 347-48 (10th Cir. 1975) (relative qualification
is not part of plaintiff's prima facie case).
95. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
96. According to the THAYER or "bursting bubble" theory, the only effect of a
presumption is to shift the burden of production xwith respect to the fact presumed. If
the evidence is produced by the defendant, the presumption is spent and disappears.
See THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 336 (1898);
MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE' 821 (2d ed. 1972). Accord 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491(2);
MODEL CODE OFEVIDENCE, Rule 704(2) (1942). For a discussion of the role presumnp-
tions play in discrimination cases, see generally Mendez, supra note 21: Belton, supra
note 37, at 1205.
97. See SCHLIE & GROSSMAN, supra note 91:
Pretext may be proven by showing that a discriminatory motive domi-
nated the articulated reason or by undermining the credibility of the
employer's articulated reasons. There are three types of evidence which a
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that only objective evidence should be considered in the prima facie
case. At stage three, the presumption would drop out, the plaintiff
would offer evidence of pretext and the court would resolve the
question of fact. Here, the plaintiff would rebut the defendant's claim
of lesser qualification with a showing of superior qualification.
C. United States Postal Service v. Aikens
In 1983, the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of
which party bears the burden of proving better qualifications in an
employment discrimination case. United States Postal Service v.
Aikens 8 involved a black Postal Service employee who filed suit under
Title VII claiming that the Postal Service had discriminated in refus-
ing to promote him. 99 Aikens showed that the Postal Service pursued a
policy of consistently promoting white persons rather than blacks. He
had a commendable personnel record and more seniority and supervi-
sory experience than any of the white persons promoted above him.
Moreover, Aikens was working toward a doctorate while none of the
twelve whites promoted over him had any college education. 00
The district court entered judgment for the Postal Service on the
ground that Aikens had failed to show as part of his prima facie case
that he was "as qualified or more qualified" than those who were
promoted.' 0 ' The court of appeals reversed, stating that proof of
relative qualification is not part of the plaintiff's prima facie case.10 2
The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision and re-
manded for reconsideration in light of the Burdine holding that the
plaintiff's burden in making out a prima facie case is not onerous.10 3
plaintiff may use in attempting to show a pretext: (1) direct evidence of
discrimination; (2) comparative evidence; and (3) statistics.
Id. at 1314.
The most common method of proving pretext is the introduction of comparative
evidence. That is, the plaintiff attempts to show that in a factually similar situation
persons in one group were treated more favorably than those in another, see, e.g.,
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976) (miore favor-
able treatment accorded black employee in reverse discrimination case) or by show-
ing that the employer departed from its normal policies. See, e.g., Harris v. Richards
Mfg. Co., 511 F. Supp. 1193, 1204-05 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) (employer's stated reasons
for transfer were not consistent with company policy). See also SCIILEI & GROSSMAN
supra note 91, at 1314-15.
98. 103 S. Ct. 1478 (1983).
99. Id. at 1480-81.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1481.
102. 642 F.2d 514, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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On remand, the court of appeals, consistent with Burdine, reaffirmed
its earlier holding. 104
Unfortunately, when the Supreme Court reviewed Aikens for a
second time, it skirted the crucial issue of which party bears the
burden of proving better qualifications. Instead, the Court noted that
it was surprising at this level of review, after a full trial on the merits,
to address the question of whether the plaintiff made out a prima facie
case. 10 5 Rather, the Court stated, the factual inquiry should be
" 'whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff.' ",106 In essence, the Court was saying that the plaintiff was
not required to prove better qualification as part of his prima facie
case; nor was the defendant required to prove plaintiff's lack of quali-
fication or the better qualifications of the party chosen as part of his
showing of a legitimate reason for his action. Instead, after the plain-
tiff presented his prima facie evidence and the defendant met his
burden of production, the presumption of discrimination "drops from
the case"'' 07 and the inquiry is strictly whether the plaintiff sustains his
burden of persuasion.
IV. Proof of Qualification in the Tenure Setting
A. Criteria Involved in Tenure Decisions
The decision to grant or deny tenure is based largely on subjective
criteria,1 0 8 as are the decisions to grant promotions in most profes-
sional level employment situations. 0 9 However, unlike an ordinary
teaching position, which is terminable at the end of the academic
year, or other professional employment which is terminable at will, 1°
a grant of tenure involves a commitment by the institution for the life
of the professor."' In Lieberman v. Gant,"12 the court quoted a
103. 453 U.S. 902 (1981).
104. 665 F.2d 1057, 1058-59 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
105. 103 S. Ct. at 1481.
106. Id. at 1482 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
107. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10). See supra note 96 and accompa-
nying text.
108. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
110. The employment-at-will rule provides that "employment relationships ...
may be terminated by either party at any time with or without notice or cause."
DeGiuseppe, The Effect of the Employment-At-Will Rule On Employee Rights To
Job Security And Fringe Benefits, 10 FoROHAM URB. L.J. 1, 2 (1981).
111. Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1980).
112. Id.
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University of Connecticut official who, in a memorandum to a faculty
committee instructing it to take special care in tenure decisions, ex-
plained:
"When in doubt, don't. Since the tenure decision is a commitment
by the University to twenty or thirty years of support and several
hundred thousand dollars of salary, from which there can be no
turning back, we have felt that if we must err, we ought to err on
the side of caution; we ought not to gamble widely.""' 3
In consideration of the extent of the university's commitment to a
tenured professor, objective criteria are insufficient to gauge qualifi-
cation for tenure. The use of subjective criteria in tenure decisions is
not only justified by the time and money invested by the institution in
a tenured professor, but also by the intangible and unquantifiable
nature of an academic's responsibilities to the university community.
Procedures for granting tenure vary among institutions. "4 Universities
generally reach the decision to grant or deny tenure after considering
three major areas of qualification: (1) teaching ability, (2) quality of
research and scholarly publications and (3) service to the university
community." 5 Since these factors are qualitative as well as quantita-
113. Id. (quoting Wilson, Vice President of the University of Connecticut) (em-
phasis in original).
114. Compare, Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 656 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 53 (1982) (there are several independent levels of
review in tenure-decision process: (i) department of which candidate is a member,
(ii) dean of school to which department belongs, (iii) ad hoe review committee, (iv)
Budget Committe of Academic Senate, (v) Office of Academic Affairs and final
decision by the Chancellor); with Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 535
(3d Cir. 1980) (department head initiates tenure process with a written recommenda-
tion to Dean; Dean forwards recommendation to Faculty Personnel and Policies
Committee, which reviews it and makes and submits own recommendation to Presi-
dent of the College; recommendations are reviewed by President, who then makes
own recommendations to Board of Trustees Committee on Education Policies and
Faculty Affairs; Committee reports to the full Board of Trustees, which is vested with
the power to grant tenure).
(tenure based on evaluation of teaching, research and public service), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 53 (1982); Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1980)
(qualification determined by evaluation of teaching, scholarship and contributions to
university); Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980)
(three categories to be considered are teaching, research and service); Scott v. Uni-
versitv of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,, 444 U.S. 931 (1979) (criteria
include teaching, scholarly activity and service to department, university and coin-
munity); Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 172 n.3
(1st Cir.) (teaching, service and scholarship must be evaluated), vacated and re-
nzanded, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Green v. Board of Regents of Tex. Tech Univ., 474
F.2d 594, 595 (5th Cir. 1973) (necessary qualifications are teaching prowess, scholar-
ship and service); Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 495 F. Supp. 1148,
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tive, the exact criteria for granting tenure vary from institution to
institution. Moreover, the weight assigned to each of the three criteria
will vary depending on the needs of a particular department within a
university at a given time. "06 For example, a department may feel that
it has been lacking in the area of research and publication, and
therefore, may weigh this factor more heavily than another depart-
ment in the school. Neither Title VII nor the Civil Rights Act require
that procedures be uniform among departments." 7 Additional minor
considerations that are factored into tenure decisions include the insti-
tution's financial health and staffing needs, "consistency of the faculty
member's educational philosophy with that of the department and the
institution," and his compatibility with other members of the depart-
ment. 1 8
Generally, satisfying the criterion of service to the university is not
difficult. Only rarely is deficiency in this area a major reason for
denial of tenure."l9 Deficiency in teaching skills is infrequently found
1159 (D. Mass. 1980) (scholarship, teaching and service), aff'd, 648 F.2d 61 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh; 435 F.
Supp. 1328, 1340 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (considerations include teaching, research, profes-
sional stature and service); Huang v. College of the Holy Cross; 436 F. Supp. 639,
642 (D. Mass. 1977) (tenure decisions involve considerations of teaching, scholarship
and service to college); Cussler v. University of Md., 430 F. Supp. 602, 604 (D. Md.
1977) (criteria include teaching, service and publications; "[1]ong years of service are,
alone, insufficient to warrant promotion"); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F.
Supp. 857, 858 (D. Vt. 1976) (criteria include contribution to the college community
and professional competence which is measured by teaching skill); EEOC v. Tufts
Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152, 160 (D. Mass. 1975) (clualification determined
by considerations of intellect, scholarship, teaching and service).
116. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE INTERESTS, supra note 21 at
476. Compare, Huang v. College of the Holy Cross, 436 F. Supp. 639, 642 n.4 (D.
Mass. 1977) (small liberal arts college emphasized teaching excellence) with Cussler
v. University of Md., 430 F. Supp. 602, 604-06 (D. Md. 1977) (desire to improve
Sociology Department fostered emphasis on calibre of scholarly research).
117. Scott v. University of Del., 455 F. Stipp. 1102, 1122 (D. Del. 1978), modi-
fied, 601 F.2d 76 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979). See Zahorik v. Cornell
Univ., 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 165, 170 (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 1984) ("denial of
tenure by an English department simply cannot be compared with a grant of tenure
in the physics or history departments").
118. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE INTERESTS, snpra note 21 at
476-78. See Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 165, 168 (2d
Cir. Feb. 22, 1984) (tenure decisions involve consideration of the "particular needs of
the department for specialties, the number of tenure positions available, and the
desired mix of well known scholars and up-and-coming faculty").
119. See, e.g., Huang v. College of the Holy Cross, 436 F. Supp. 639, 647 (D.
Mass. 1977) (reservations regarding quality of plaintiff's service to the university
were held in good faith). However, it should be noted that in Huang, this factor
alone was insufficient. The college also found serious fault with plaintiff's teaching
ability, id. at 646, and that his educational philosophy, as reflected by his "Five-Year
Plan," was not consistent with that of his department Id. at 645-46.
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to be the key in denying tenure. 120 However, in Johnson v. University
of Pittsburgh,'12 the plaintiff's teaching was totally unacceptable to
faculty and students alike. 122 In the typical case, the university finds
the quality of the plaintiff's scholarship or research to be deficient. 123
Institutions have been overwhelmingly successful in defending
against discrimination suits. 124 Various theories have been offered to
120. See Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 984 (1978) (plaintiff's teaching performance was unacceptable); Huang v.
College of the Holy Cross, 436 F. Supp. 639, 646 (D. Mass. 1977) (plaintiff's teaching
was only adequate); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1343
(W.D. Pa. 1977) (plaintiff's teaching was unacceptable); Peters v. Middlebury Col-
lege, 409 F. Supp. 857, 860 (D. Vt. 1976) (failure to satisfactorily teach the courses
for which she was recruited). See supra note 99 and accompanying text for discussion
of Huang.
121. 435 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
122. In Johnson, the student dissatisfaction rose to such a degree that during one
lecture "10 or 12 other students . . . stood up and began to shout obscenities in the
middle of the lecture and then complete chaos broke out . . . . In fact, the abuse and
the language was so extreme that I had never seen anything like it in a classroom."
Id. at 1336-37 (quoting from deposition of Dr. Glew, a faculty observer).
123. See Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981)
(deficient scholarship is valid reason for denial of tenure), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 53
(1982); Lieberman v. Gant 630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980) (inadequate scholarship);
Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 931
(1979) (research activity was inadequate); Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith
College, 495 F. Supp. 1148, 1160 (D. Mass. 1980) (quantity and style of publications
deficient), aff'd, 648 F.2d 61 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Laborde
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 495 F. Supp. 1067, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (failure to
produce new scholarly material), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 820 (1983); Cussler v.
University of Md., 430 F. Supp. 602, 606-07 (D. Md. 1977) (poor quality publi-
cations since last promotion).
124. See, e.g., Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 165,
171-72 (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 1984); Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 1980);
Manning v. Trustees of Tufts College, 613 F.2d 1200, 1204 (1st Cir. 1980); Davis v.
Weidner, 596 F.2d 726, 733 (7th Cir. 1979); Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d
1150, 1157 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 904 (1978); Sime v. Trustees of Cal. State
Univs. & Colleges, 526 F.2d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 1975); Faro v. New York Univ., 502
F.2d 1229, 1233 (2d Cir. 1974); Poddar v. Youngstown State Univ., 480 F.2d 192,
195 (6th Cir. 1973); Green v. Board of Regents of Tex. Tech Univ., 474 F.2d 594,
596 (5th Cir. 1973); Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 495 F. Supp.
1148, 1161 (D. Mass. 1980), afJ'd, 648 F.2d 61 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098
(1981); Laborde v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 495 F. Supp. 1067, 1073 (C.D. Cal.
1980), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 820 (1983); Gilinsky v. Columbia Univ., 488 F. Supp.
1309, 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Cap v. Lehigh Univ., 450 F. Supp. 460, 468 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 442 F. Supp. 593, 628 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
afJ'd mem., 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978); Citron v. Jackson State Univ., 456 F.
Supp. 3, 17 (S.D. Miss. 1977), afJ'd mem., 577 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1978); Morpurgo
v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1135, 1138 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afJ'd mem., 580 F.2d
1045 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1000 (1978); Johnson v. University of Pitts-
burgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1372 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Huang v. College of the Holy
Cross, 436 F. Supp. 639, 656 (D. Mass. 1977); Cussler v. University of Md., 430 F.
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explain the consistent success of university defendants. The first is that
the federal judiciary is unsympathetic to sex discrimination cases,
particularly in the academic context. 125 Another theory is that the
judiciary is reluctant to scrutinize the meritocracy surrounding the
academic process, 126 which is "extremely narrow and excludes large
portions of the available qualified pool of job candidates."' 127 The
reason may be that hiring or granting tenure only through prestige
appointments attracts other prestige candidates who attract better
students who, in turn, join the academic world through the "old boy
network.' ' 128 Appointing women to tenured positions does not achieve
these results, not because women have low prestige, but "because they
Supp. 602, 609 (D. Md. 1977); Jawa v. Fayettesville State Univ., 426 F. Supp. 218,
230 (E.D.N.C. 1976); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 869 (D. Vt.
1976); Labat v. Board of Higher Educ., 401 F. Supp. 753, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Plaintiffs' successes have largely been procedural. See, e.g., Felton v. Trustees of
the Cal. State Univs. and Colleges, 708 F.2d 1507, 1510 (9th Cir. 1983) (remanded
for reconsideration with proper standard of proof for defendant); Gray v. Board of
Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1982) (plaintiff permitted discovery of
two college tenure committee members on his unsuccessful applications for promo-
tion and reappointment with tenure); Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d
1337, 1348 (9th Cir. 1981) (remanded to allow plaintiff access to her tenure file in
order to show pretext), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 53 (1982); Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1384-85 (5th Cir. 1980) (improper burden of proof placed on
plaintiff at trial); Eichman v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 597 F.2d 1104,
1110 (7th Cir. 1979) (summary judgment for defendant reversed); EEOC v. Colby
College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978) (same); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d
397, 413 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); Al-Hamdani v. State Univ. of N.Y., 438 F. Supp.
299, 303 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (plaintiff withstood motion for summary judgment);
O'Connell v. Teachers College, 63 F.R.D. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same).
125. See SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 3 at 63-64. The author contends that
there is a general insensitivity of the judiciary to academic sex discrimination cases.
Id. For instance, in Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231 (2d Cir. 1974), the
judge stated that the plaintiff "envisions herself as a modern Jeanne d'Arc fighting for
the rights of embattled womanhood on an academic battlefield, facing a solid
phalanx of men and male faculty prejudice."Id. The trial judge in Cussler v. Univer-
sity of Md., 430 F. Supp. 602 (D. Md. 1977) was quoted as saying in court before the
jury that the suit did not belong in court and that sex-bias laws perhaps should not be
on the books. Id. at 604 (quoting Diamondback, Apr. 19, 1977 at 4, col. 4 (daily
student newspaper, College Park Campus, Univ. of Md.)).
See also JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE INTERESTS, supra note 21
at 491. This article discusses a more subliminal type of discrimination. It suggests
that the academicians attacked by the plaintiff share with the judge the status of
membership in "intellectual professions" and that, therefore, a judge may empathize
with the scholarly decisionmakers. Id. See also supra note 72 and accompanying text
(judges have more understanding of the workings of upper-level and professional
employment).
126. See SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 3 at 65.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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are outside the prestige system entirely and for this reason are of no
use to a department in future recruitment."' 12 9
One authority has suggested that the low percentage of reported
cases in which plaintiffs have obtained final relief results from the fact
that educational institutions are more susceptible to settlement at-
tempts in Title VII suits than are other employers. 130 Although this
suggestion seems meritorious, it is impossible to substantiate since
academic institutions are reluctant to discuss their settled Title VII
cases. 131
The most convincing line of inquiry, however, is that the subjective
nature of the tenure decision-making process makes it particularly
difficult for a plaintiff to prove "disparate treatment" under Title
VII. 132 This result occurs because the defendant can easily show quali-
tative differences in such subjective areas as experience, teaching
ability and scholarship between the plaintiff and the party selected. 133
The subjective nature of the decision has fostered the continuing
judicial "hands-off" policy to review of tenure cases. 1:4
B. The History of Judicial Non-Intervention
1. The Early Cases
Prior to the 1972 amendment 3 5 to Title VII, educational institu-
tions were exempt from scrutiny under the Act. 13" Even after the Act
129. Id. (quoting L. LEwIs, SCALING TlE IVORiY TOWER 123-24 (1975)).
130. See JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF ACADEMIC COLILECTIVE INTERESTS, so pra note 21
at 483 n.48. The settled cases include: Craig v. Alabama State Univ., 451 F. Supp.
1207 (M.D. Ala. 1978), aff'd mere., 614 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1980); Rackin v.
University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
131. Unanswered letters to Deans of Faculty Affairs at several colleges and univer-
sities corroborate this theory.
132. See JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE INTERESTS, supra note 21
at 492.
133. Id. at 494.
134. See infra notes 135-68 and accolnpanying text.
135. See supra note 5. Originally, Title VII exempted all educational institutions
with respect to faculty employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 1 (1970)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1976)). There is no legislative history which
indicates the rationale for the exemption of educational institutions from the act. The
House Report encouraging the 1972 amendment stated:
There is nothing in the legislative background of Title VII, nor does any
national policy suggest itself to support the exemption of these educational
institution employees-primarily teachers-from Title VII coverage. Dis-
crimination against minorities and women in the field of education is as
pervasive as discrimination in any other area of employment.
H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS pp. 2137, 2155.
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was amended, however, federal courts continued to follow a "hands-
off" policy in the area of university employment. For example, in
Green v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech,' 37 which was decided the
year after the amendment, the court of appeals affirmed the pre-
amendment holding of the district court. 38 The lower court had held
that faculty evaluations "are necessarily judgmental and the Court
will not substitute its judgment for the rational and well-considered
judgment of those possessing expertise in the field."' 39 The court fur-
ther held that decisions of this nature "are not justiciable in the
absence of abuse of discretion, capricious action or discrimination of
Further, the legislative history notes that when women
have been hired into educational institutions, particularly in institutions of
higher education, [they] have been relegated to positions of lesser standing
than their male counterparts. In a study ... it was found that the primary
factors determining the hiring of male faculty members were prestige and
compatability, but that women were generally considered to be outside of
the prestige system altogether.
Id. Most of the university discrimination cases involve alleged sex discrimination. See
Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 165 (2d Cir. Feb. 22,
1984); Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 53 (1982); Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.
1980); Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980); Davis v.
Weidner, 596 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1979); Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978); Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State
College, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Faro v.
New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974); Green v. Board of Regents of Tex.
Tech Univ., 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973); Laborde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
495 F. Supp. 1067 (C.D. Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 820 (1983); Gilinsky v.
Columbia Univ., 488 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Johnson v. University of
Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Cussler v. University of Md. 430 F.
Supp. 602 (D. Md. 1977); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857 (D. Vt.
1976); EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152 (D. Mass. 1975).
But see Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir 1980) (alleged race
discrimination); Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d 76 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 931 (1979) (same); Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 495 F. Supp.
1148 (D. Mass. 1980) (alleged discrimination based on race and national origin),
aff'd, 648 F.2d 61 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Huang v College of
the Holy Cross, 436 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1977) (alleged discrimination based on
race, national origin and color).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 1 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1976));
see, e.g., Green v. Board of Regents of Tex. Tech Univ., 335 F. Supp. 249, 251 (N.D.
Tex. 1971) (academic judgments are not justiciable in absence of abuse of discretion);
Lewis v. Chicago State College, 299 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (N.D. 111. 1969) ("[t]he
judiciary is not the appropriate forum for decisions involving academic rank"). See
also SEx DIsCRIMINATION, supra note 3, at 62 (unsympathetic attitude of pre-Title
VII courts not remedied by passage of the Act).
137. 474 F.2d 594, 594 (5th Cir. 1973).
138. See 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973), affg 335 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
139. 335 F. Supp. at 250.
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such a nature as to constitute a violation or deprivation of constitu-
tional rights. ' 1 40
2. Faro v. New York University
The first case of university employment discrimination brought
under Title VII was Faro v. New York University.141 In Faro, the
defendant institution was alleged to have discriminated against the
plaintiff by failing to consider her for a tenured position.142 In decid-
ing the case, the Second Circuit did not even acknowledge the for-
mula established by the Court in McDonnell Douglas in the previous
year. 143 Rather, the court concluded, without any discussion of Title
VII that "no violation of any provision of Title VII was involved
"1144
Despite the clearly established McDonnell Douglas precedent and
statutory authorization,145 the lower courts were content to follow the
established tradition of non-intervention in university cases. Indeed,
the Faro court stated that university level educational and faculty
appointments are least suited for federal court supervision. 141 The
court specifically acknowledged that judgments regarding faculty
members "require a discriminating analysis of the qualifications of
each candidate for hiring or advancement, taking into consideration
his or her educational experience, the specifications of the particular
position available and, of great importance, the personality of the
candidate.' 1 47 In essence, the court said that subjective considerations
are crucial in tenure cases and that the court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the committee within the university charged
with making the decision. 148
3. The McDonnell Douglas Era
For years after the Faro decision, the lower courts accepted its
reasoning and proceeded on the theory that they should apply only
140. Id. at 251 (citing Lewis v. Chicago State College, 299 F. Supp. 1357 (N.D.
Ill. 1969)).
141. 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974).
142. Id. at 1230.
143. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text for discussion of the McDonnell
Douglas formula.
144. Faro, 502 F.2d at 1233.
145. See Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 8, 86 Stat. 103, 106 (1972).
146. 502 F.2d at 1231-32.
147. Id. at 1232. See PROFESSIONAL JoBs, supra note 63 at 203-05 for a discussion
of Faro.
148. Faro, 502 F.2d at 1232.
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minimal scrutiny to cases arising in an academic employment set-
ting. 149 In spite of their unwillingness to abandon the traditional non-
interference role, the courts did begin to recognize that the McDon-
nell Douglas analysis 150 was applicable in the university context.' 15
In Cussler v. University of Maryland,152 the court explained the
McDonnell Douglas allocation of burdens but declined to apply it to
the plaintiff. Instead, the court adopted an "even if" attitude toward
the plaintiff's offer of proof. 153 The court focused on what it consid-
ered to be legitimate reasons for plaintiff's non-promotion and con-
cluded that "defendant denied plaintiff's promotion on the basis of
legitimate reasons that were not a pretext for sex discrimination."1 54
Holding that there was no discrimination, the court referred to its
agreement with the general judicial reluctance to intercede in matters
of academic judgment.1 55
Similarly, in Huang v. College of the Holy Cross,156 the court
perfunctorily stated the requirements for making out a prima facie
149. See, e.g., Stebbins v. Weaver, 537 F.2d 939, 943 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Huang.College of the Holy Cross, 436 F. Supp. 639,
653 (D. Mass. 1977); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1353-54
(W.D. Pa. 1977); Cussler v. University of Md., 430 F. Supp. 602, 605-06 (D. Md.
1977); Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (M.D. Pa.
1976); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 868 (D. Vt. 1976); EEOC v.
Tufts Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152, 158 (D. Mass. 1975).
150. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 165, 169
(2d Cir. Feb. 22, 1984); Felton v. Trustees of Cal. State Univs. and Colleges, 708
F.2d 1507, 1509 (9th Cir. 1983); Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., City of New York,
692 F.2d 901, 905 (2d Cir. 1982); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 685 F.2d 743, 748 (1st
Cir. 1982); Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 53 (1982); Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 62-63 (2d
Cir. 1980); Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 539 (3d Cir. 1980); Man-
ning v. Trustees of Tufts College, 613 F.2d 1200, 1202 (1st Cir. 1980); Jepsen v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1382, (5th Cir. 1980); Scott v. University of
Del., 601 F.2d 76, 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979); Davis v. Weidner,
596 F.2d 726, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1979); Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1155
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978); Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith
College, 495 F. Supp. 1148, 1152-53 (D. Mass. 1980), afJ'd, 648 F.2d 61 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Gilinsky v. Columbia Univ., 488 F. Supp. 1309,
1313 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1352
(W.D. Pa. 1977); Huang v. College of the Holy Cross, 436 F. Supp. 639, 653 (D.
Mass. 1977); Cussler v. University of Md., 430 F. Supp. 602, 605 (D. Md. 1977);
Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 866 (D. Vt. 1976); EEOC v. Tufts
Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152, 158 n.5 (D. Mass. 1975).
152. 430 F. Supp. 602 (D. Md. 1977).
153. Id. at 606.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 605-06. The court further rationalized its holding by referring to
campus unrest sparked by the invasion of Cambodia and discord between the faculty
and the administration. Id.
156. 436 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1977).
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case as enunciated by the McDonnell Douglas Court. 157 However,
instead of adhering to the test, the court devised a different prima
facie analysis for the tenure context. The plaintiff was required to
show: (1) that he belonged to a racial minority, (2) that the procedure
followed by the college in his case was irregular, (3) that according to
the college's standards he was as qualified as others who were granted
tenure, and (4) that he was a candidate for tenure, and despite his
qualifications, tenure was denied.15 Application of this test would
require a plaintiff, as part of his prima facie case, to prove that he was
better qualified than others promoted. Moreover, the court failed to
apply its own test. It proceeded instead to the second step of the
analysis and explained why defendant's articulated reasons for dis-
missal-deficient teaching and service-were legitimate and nondis-
criminatory. 159 As in Cussler, the plaintiff was not afforded the oppor-
tunity to show pretext. Instead, the court stated that plaintiff had a
fair opportunity, presumably as part of his prima facie case, to prove
pretext but failed to do so. 160 The Huang court prefaced its analysis
with a statement that since tenure decisions involve difficult qualita-
tive judgments, the university's decision must be accorded great defer-
ence. 161
The legitimacy of tenure discrimination claims under Title VII was
finally recognized by the Second Circuit in Powell v. Syracuse Univer-
sity. 16 2 The Powell court recognized that the judicial anti-interven-
tionist policy had "been pressed beyond all reasonable limits, and may
be employed to undercut the explicit legislative intent of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964."163 The court realized that its obligation, as ex-
pressed by the circuit court in Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene
State College,6 4 was to provide a forum for litigation of university
discrimination claims arising under Title VII as readily as for other
Title VII suits. 165 The Powell court decided that its task was "to steer a
careful course between excessive intervention in the affairs of the
university and the unwarranted tolerance of unlawful behavior."'16 6
Although Powell marked a turning-point in the willingness of the
157. Id. at 653.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 653-54.
160. Id. at 656.
161. Id. at 653.
162. 580 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978).
163. Id. at 1153.
164. 569 F.2d 169, 176-77 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
165. Powell, 580 F.2d at 1154.
166. Id.
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courts to review academic decisions,' 67 it did not resolve the problems
which result from the subjective nature of tenure decisions.
C. Proof of Qualification in Tenure Cases
The underlying issue in a tenure case is qualification; a correlative
question is at what stage of the analysis should evidence of subjective
qualification be introduced. Determinations of qualification for ten-
ure necessarily involve consideration of subjective criteria. 6 8 The
question of the function of showing better qualification or lack thereof
in the tenure context remains unsettled though some guidance has
been provided by the McDonnell Douglas/Furnco/Sweeney/Burdine
progression. 169
Before Burdine, 70 some courts held that the plaintiff had to show
that he was qualified to be granted tenure in order to make out a
prima facie case.' 71 In Lieberman v. Gant, 72 decided the year before
Burdine, the court stated that the "candidate for tenure does not make
out the elements needed for a prima facie case merely by showing
qualifications for continuation as an untenured faculty member; in-
deed to hold that he did would be in effect to negate the requirements
beyond minimally satisfactory performance properly entering into the
tenure decision." 7 3
However, courts considering tenure cases after Burdine have gener-
ally adhered to its holding that the plaintiff's burden of establishing a
prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous, 74 and that,
therefore, only objective qualification need be considered as part of
the prima facie case. 75 In the university setting, objective qualifica-
167. Cases referring to the language in Powell include Lynn v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1342 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (Congress gave federal courts
responsibility to resolve claims of discrimination in universities), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 53 (1982); Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 551 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Court cannot shirk responsibility imposed on it by Congress to resolve claims of
academic discrimination); Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th
Cir. 1980) (fear of undue intervention in university affairs cannot be permitted to
undercut intent of Title VII).
168. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 27-58 and accompanying text for discussion of the four-case
progression.
170. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
172. 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980).
173. Id. at 64; accord Labat v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 401 F.
Supp. 753, 756-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
174. 450 U.S. at 253.
175. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
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tions would include, for example, the number of years on the faculty,
the number of scholarly publications,"" membership in honor soci-
eties and participation on committees. 77 The court in Lynn v. Re-
gents of the University of California 78 recognized, for example, that
only objective qualifications should be considered in a plaintiff's
prima facie case. 79 These qualifications would include the level of
education of the faculty member, years of teaching experience both
overall and at the particular institution, and the publication of schol-
arly materials.180 Consideration of relative qualification at the first
stage of the case would collapse the McDonnell Douglas scheme since
it would require plaintiff to prove his claim at the outset of the case.
Adherence to the Burdine minimum qualification standard is criti-
cal to ensure a triable issue in the tenure setting. Since the fundamen-
tal question in any disparate treatment claim is motive,' 8' to dismiss
the case at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis because
the plaintiff failed to show better qualification than the party selected
completely avoids the question of motive. Since the criteria considered
in tenure decisions are highly subjective, forcing the plaintiff to reveal
the extent of his qualification at step one would permit the defendant
to tailor his step two rebuttal to counter the plaintiff's claim in step
one. For example, a plaintiff might, as part of his prima facie case,
show scholarly qualifications equivalent to those of the party chosen.
The defendant could simply claim, in the second step, that the em-
phasis of the department at the time the plaintiff was considered for
tenure was on strengthening the teaching abilities of its faculty, and
further that in its view, the plaintiff's teaching abilities were unsatis-
factory. Even this degree of proof would not be required. It would be
sufficient, at least for most courts, for the defendant to show that the
plaintiff's teaching fell short of excellence.182 Given that the judiciary
is reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of the academicians, a
contrived reason could be accepted as legitimate. Moreover, if the
176. Number of publications is an objective criterion while quality of scholarship,
as discussed supra notes 115-23, is a subjective criterion.
177. Participation on committees or involvement in university affairs is an objec-
tive criterion while the value of the contribution, as discussed supra notes 115-23, is a
subjective consideration.
178. 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981).
179. Id. at 1344.
180. Id. at 1345 n.8. But see supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text for
discussion of subjective criteria used in tenure decisions.
181. See RELATIVE QUALIFICAriONS, supra note 8.
182. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff is required to show relative qualification at step one, it would
be insignificant to introduce pretext at step three since the pretext
evidence would have been exposed as part of the prima facie case.18 3
Adherence to a minimal scrutiny test at step one would implement
the congressional intent of the amendment. Title VII was extended to
include employees of academic institutions because Congress recog-
nized the ease with which discrimination could be disguised in an
academic setting. 84 The House Report on the amendment declared
that "[d]iscrimination against minorities and women in the field of
education is as pervasive as discrimination in any other area of em-
ployment."' 18 5 Evidence of sex discrimination in academia was de-
scribed as "truly appalling, "186 "gross"'' 8 and "blatant.' ' 88 Actually,
employment decisions which are so fully based on subjective criteria
are perhaps the most suspect since they are easily manipulated and are
not subject to careful scrutiny. The employees whose careers are
decided on the basis of subjective factors are those who most require
Title VII's protections. To require faculty plaintiffs to prove at the
outset that they were qualified according to a particular department's
criteria would return them to their pre-Amendment position of having
no recourse against a university in the event of discrimination.
Refusal to grant tenure will necessarily involve a deficiency in one
of the three subjective categories of teaching ability, research and
scholarship, and service to the community. 89 Since the employer
bases his decision on an evaluation of these criteria, the proper place
for their introduction is in the defendant's "articulation" of valid
reasons. Generally, defendants in tenure cases have been able to
introduce evidence regarding these subjective factors as part of their
rebuttals at step two. 190 Based on deficiencies in one of the three
criteria, universities have claimed lack of qualification as their "legiti-
mate non-discriminatory reason" for denying tenure.' 9 '
183. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text for discussion of relative
qualification as part of the McDonnell Douglas formula.
184. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 175 (lst
Cir. 1978).
185. H. Rep. No. 92-238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2155.
186. 117 Cong. Rec. 3247 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
187. 118 Cong. Bee. 1992 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
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It is difficult for the plaintiff to defeat the defendant's step two
articulation of non-qualification. 192 The problem of proof of pretext is
exacerbated by the willingness of the judiciary to follow a non-inter-
ventionist policy in tenure decisions. Therefore, in the university con-
text, the McDonnell Douglas procedure has been perfunctorily ap-
plied but the result seems to be predetermined. Unless a defendant
openly admits to discrimination, the plaintiff must resort to statistics,
individual comparisons with faculty members who were selected for
tenure positions, expert testimony and the testimony of the parties
themselves.19 3 The difficulty is that even a reliable statistical showing
may not be probative of the motives of the department in the plain-
tiff's case, and motive is vital in a disparate treatment case.194
A faculty plaintiff's showing of pretext in a disparate treatment suit
against an academic institution may be most persuasive where the
plaintiff demonstrates that the procedures for granting tenure which
were detailed in the faculty handbook were not strictly followed. For
example, the court in EEOC v. Tufts Institution of Learning 1 t5 em-
phasized the traditional stance of substantive non-interference and
explained the manner in which it would review an academic decision:
[T]he criteria and procedures established by a university for pro-
motion and reappointment of facnltv members are controlling.
Thus, where the criteria are reasonably related to the professional
duties of the academic position sought and to the personal qualifi-
cations of the applicant, and are applied through prescribed or
settled procedures fairly and reasonably followed, the court should
not substitute its judgment for that of the university authorities. 9"
In essence, the court stated that it would be willing to find academic
Title VII violations based on procedural irregularities, though it was
unwilling to interfere in the merits of an academic decision.
Similarly, the court in Huang v. College of the Holy Cross, 19 7 found
that the irregular procedures followed in the plaintiff's case may have
warranted a finding of discrimination, but it refused to substitute its
judgment for that of the college on the substantive issue. 98 Therefore,
if a faculty plaintiff could establish that tenure decision-making pro-
192. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
193. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE INTERESTS, supra note 21, at
493.
194. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
195. 421 F. Supp. 152 (D. Mass. 1975).
196. Id. at 158.
197. 436 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1977).
198. Id. at 653.
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cedures were not fairly applied in his case, pretext might be estab-
lished and the court would be likely to intervene.
The Second Circuit in Zahorik v. Cornell University'99 noted that it
was not the province of the judiciary to determine the level of achieve-
ment required for tenure in a particular case. 200 The court added that,
"[d]epartures from procedural regularity, such as a failure to collect
all available evidence, can raise a question as to the good faith of the
process where the departure may reasonably affect the decision." 20' If
this inference of discrimination were coupled with a showing that a
candidate had significant support for a favorable decision from the
faculty or outside scholars, a prima facie case would be established.
20 2
The burden of production would shift to the defendant, and its re-
sponse could "be attacked both on its logic and the substantiality of
the underlying file."-20 3 Thus, the defendant's articulation would have
to encompass both the procedural and substantive aspects of its deci-
sion and would afford the plaintiff a greater opportunity to show
pretext.
V. Conclusion
A faculty plaintiff alleging "disparate treatment" in a university
setting faces almost insurmountable barriers to proving his claim. The
most viable method of showing discrimination under Title VII in this
type of case is the three-step analysis enunciated by the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas and refined in several subsequent deci-
sions. Particularly in a university context, the faculty plaintiff should
be required to prove only objective qualification in order to meet the
prima facie test. Evidence relating to the subjective elements which
are the basis of a tenure decision should be introduced by the defend-
ant as part of his articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for his actions.
However, in the university context, the defendant's burden should
be two-fold. As the Supreme Court noted in McDonnell Douglas, the
defendant must articulate a legitimate reason for the action taken.
Additionally, it should be required to show that the review procedures
followed in the plaintiff's case were in strict accordance with policies
detailed in the faculty handbook or, where no handbook is in use, that
199. 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 165 (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 1984).
200. Id. at 170.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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the standard procedures of the department and the institution have
been substantially followed. This would afford a faculty plaintiff the
opportunity to attack the university's decision on both substantive and
procedural grounds. Since courts are reluctant to intervene in substan-
tive academic decision-making but are willing to review procedural
irregularities, the plaintiff would have an opportunity to show that a
procedural irregularity resulted in a discriminatory determination in
his case.
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